Wendell Mendell
NASA Johnson Space Center
Houston, TX 77058
A lesson of Space Station Freedom is that it is dangerous to promise specific tangible returns from an undefined program. A lesson of the Space Exploration Initiative is that Congress will not buy a large program of human exploration justified by nonspecific, intangible benefits. The value and inevitability of human exploration of space can be argued convincingly on philosophical grounds. However, translating philosophy into funding requires a national consensus on space program policy and strategy before engineers begin designs of spaceships. If the Executive Branch is unable or unwilling to establish a political consensus with the Legislative Branch, then NASA leadership must consider nontraditional alliances to ensure that the space program is perceived by the political process to meet national needs.
On July 20, 1989, President Bush declared on the steps of the National Air and Space Museum[1]:
"...I'm proposing a long-range commitment: first, for the coming decade, for the 1990s, Space Station Freedom, our critical next step in all our space endeavors; and next, for the new century, back to the Moon, back to the future, and this time, back to stay. And then a journey into tomorrow, a journey to another planet, a manned mission to Mars. Each mission should and will lay the groundwork for the next, and the pathway to the stars begins as it did 20 years ago with you, the American people, and it continues just up the street there to the United States Congress, where the future of the Space Station and our future as a spacefaring nation will be decided...."
A more ringing endorsement of human space exploration could not be imagined. The President's "long-range commitment" explicitly describes a process of stepwise expansion of human presence beyond low Earth orbit, putting meat on the bones of the space policy augmentation of February, 1988. At last, the human spaceflight program was given a very explicit strategic pathway into the 21st Century.
By July 20, 1993, the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) was moribund, if not just plain dead. Congress had not only refused to fund studies, but staffers had marched through the NASA budget and had stricken items that even sounded as if they could be associated with SEI. NASA's Report of the 90-day Study on the Human Exploration of the Moon and Mars[2], delivered to the President at the end of 1989, was criticized by the Vice-President of the United States, among others. A Committee on the Future of the Space Program (Augustine Committee)[3] was formed in 1990 to "advise the NASA Administrator on overall approaches NASA management can use to implement the U.S. Space Program in the coming decades," presumably because NASA was in need of advice. A Synthesis Group[4] was commissioned by the Vice-President to reach out to the nation for alternate approaches to human exploration of the planets, presumably because NASA had been less than thorough in its deliberations. In 1992 the position of Associate Administrator for Exploration was eliminated. The attempt by NASA to implement the SEI could be called charitably a political disaster.
Although NASA accepted all constructive input with official politeness, there was a strong feeling within the agency that the storm of criticism was at best uninformed and at worst malicious and unfair. Much of the blame for lack of progress was laid at the feet of a supposedly intransigent and shortsighted Congress. The validity of that proposition has been discussed elsewhere[5] and goes beyond the scope of this paper.
What I want to examine here is the idea that the rationale for the space program has not been properly communicated to Congress or, alternatively, the American people. According to common wisdom, endemic ignorance among policymakers would be overcome if everyone associated with the space program would get out and "communicate" the benefits of the space program. While I agree that explaining the space program to the public is good and even necessary, and while I believe that the average Congressperson is not very knowledgeable about space, I doubt that an intensive campaign of "education" will suffice to save the space program.
Launching human beings into space is currently quite an expensive proposition and comes under active scrutiny in times of scarce public funds. Some critics believe the space program is an unaffordable luxury. Money spent in space should be used instead to reduce the Federal debt or to mitigate various societal ills.
Within the space community, some argue that most astronaut activities (e.g., launching a satellite from the Shuttle) could be done less expensively using systems that do not require human presence. Behind many of these arguments is the unspoken corollary that human spaceflight is nowhere near as cost-efficient as robotic investigations in terms of returned scientific knowledge. Most thoughtful analysts of the space program dispute the proposition that cancellation of human programs would result in increased funding of robotic exploration. In fact, many believe that most interest in space exploration by the general public is based on identification with astronauts. Nevertheless, all programs within the space budget experience very real fiscal pressure from overruns and losses in the very expensive human programs. (Even within the robotic exploration program similar pressure is experienced by the research and analysis budgets from overruns in spacecraft development. The working scientists are at the bottom of the food chain.)
Pressures on the Federal budget force NASA managers proposing new human spaceflight programs to justify their proposals. Since NASA employees are trained to think in terms of presentation charts, new programs are defended with statements of benefits, short enough to fit behind a viewgraph "bullet". The general public presumes that the justifications are based on an analysis of needs from which these new programs are generated. Unfortunately, rationale for the Space Station has oscillated in an embarrassing fashion over the past dozen years, belying the existence of a needs analysis. Even the most dedicated space enthusiasts are confused as to the real purpose of Space Station Freedom.
I believe the Space Station program has been the victim of a lack of strategic planning for human spaceflight. The idea that a low Earth orbit space station is the next logical step after the Space Shuttle hearkens back to the recommendations of the Space Task Group (STG)[6] reporting to President Nixon in 1969. However, those recommendations have no official status, having been rejected at the time for budgetary reasons. Justifications for the current Space Station has never been officially described in the context of the STG plan, and I have rarely heard it discussed inside NASA in those terms. In lieu of a long-range planning context, the station was sold in terms of functions thought to be politically attractive. In other words, the justification was created post hoc..
Managers planning the Space Exploration Initiative in 1989 were very sensitive to the "oversell" of the Space Station and strove to avoid hyperbole for their program. However, they were much less aware of the gift implicit in President Bush's speech. The Reagan Administration had added to national space policy in 1988 a goal to extend permanent human presence beyond low Earth orbit. The Bush Administration had reiterated that element, and the Apollo Anniversary Speech gave an explicit formulation for its execution. Thus, the program for human spaceflight finally was placed in a context that would allow long-range planning without ad hoc justifications.
Unfortunately, NASA leadership did not appreciate the importance of a strategic context. They operated under what I call the Apollo Syndrome[5] wherein the lunar base and Mars flights were seen to be just two more programs layered onto Shuttle and Space Station with little emphasis on their interrelation. Work was done in the Exploration Program Office to understand how the Space Station could be "scarred" to "support" Mars exploration or to understand how lunar systems might be designed to work on Mars also. These attempts to save money on life-cycle costs for space systems are only pale reflections of a single overall program of human spaceflight containing well-integrated orbital and planetary surface elements.
Congress operated under the same paradigm and rejected the notion that permission to land humans on the Moon and on Mars should be given to a NASA which was struggling with two much more modest programs in low Earth orbit. Although many in Congress expressed sympathy with the concept of human space exploration, Congress was not engaged by NASA or by the National Space Council in a dialogue on the appropriate structure, scope, and time scale. Clearly, a thorough policy review would open Pandora's Box and place ongoing programs at political risk. However, given the recent paroxysms of Space Station, the benefits of reaching a national consensus might have been worth the risk.
Given the hostile political environment, what does one do to "justify" a lunar base? How does one answer the question, "Why go to the Moon?"?
The best response is to list the benefits of going to the Moon. Tangible benefits are always preferable, but in an undefined program any identified tangible benefits are likely to be educated guesses. At one time, this might have been adequate; but the Space Station experience teaches that the political process will actually remember promises and will use unfulfilled ones against a program. The lesson is to avoid overselling - or hype, as it is often called. And success is not always a defense. Currently the Hubble program is being criticized for touting too many discoveries in the press.[7]
Justification strategy has now moved to citing intangible benefits. Although these benefits are not compelling, they do have the advantage of being less vulnerable to future refutation. Presentations supporting the SEI cite improvements in the quality of life through advances in technology, inspiring youth for entering technical fields, spurring competitiveness, instilling pride in U.S. citizens, and bringing nations together for peaceful cooperation. This list stems from a hasty market analysis of "national needs", circa 1990. While I do believe that these benefits are real and could flow from a well-conceived program of human exploration, I am not convinced that they would follow from every program of lunar bases and Mars missions.
A somewhat more sophisticated strategy is to avoid promises altogether and instead describe what would be done on the Moon or on Mars. The audience can evaluate the worth of lunar surface activities on its own terms of reference. Duke[8], in an AIAA paper entitled, "Why Explore the Moon?", states that the Moon is "a stepping stone in the expansion of humanity beyond the Earth", "opens new opportunities for scientific advancement not available on Earth", and will provide the first significant resources from space. Implicit in the presentation is the premise the space development and space exploration are desirable or even inevitable manifestations of the human condition.
The inevitability of human expansion beyond the Earth is a theme which is usually supported by historical analogy and/or anthropological arguments. A good example of this type is the AIAA paper, "Why Explore the Universe?", by Robert McC. Adams[9]. The anthropological imperative is explored at length in the book Interstellar Migrations and the Human Experience by Ben Finney and Eric Jones[10]. While the premise that homo sapiens will go where able to go is compelling, it is not very useful in arguments for funds in the current fiscal year. What is inevitable in evolutionary terms can be postponed on evolutionary time scales.
We can see that arguments for a lunar base (or other human space initiative) which can catch a Congressperson's eye on a viewgraph are most likely to be those promising deliverables. Yet promises from an undefined program have high uncertainties for fulfillment. On the other hand, the more successful arguments tend to be philosophical in nature and require time to take root in the national mindset. A program manager must legitimately expect consensus to be in place before he/she arrives on the scene. In other words, the U.S. Space Program requires a policy apparatus whose function is to obtain consensus on policy goals and programmatic objectives before the engineers begin to publish designs.
If the space policy apparatus of the Executive Branch is unwilling or unable to work toward a consensus with the Congress, then NASA must abandon its ambitions or engage in some sobering analysis of its self-image as a "special" endeavor. Since NASA is forbidden by law to market its programs to the Congress or to the public, its only alternative is to form alliances with elements of the body politic whose interests could be advanced by participation in an active space program. In a pluralistic political process, programs with many advocates are more robust than those supported by single voices. Alliances imply mutual accommodation and compromise with some loss of control over definition of objectives. NASA has difficulty with this concept because traditionally it has had control of funds and therefore absolute power over other participants in (civilian) space activities. In addition, the potential of contractual relationship places constraints on the freedom of association of a Government agency.
One example of a possible ally is the education lobby. NASA has a wide range of educational programs operating at low levels. Although these efforts are good, they do not given a great deal of thought within the agency; and they do not operate at the scale which would cause education advocates to swarm to the defense of the NASA budget. To illustrate the type of thinking required, Mendell[5] describes a possible program, leading to a telescope on the Moon, which would have heavy involvement from educational institutions.
A second example is the minimal interest NASA leadership has shown in support offered from the civil engineering community. Before NASA formed its Exploration Office, we lunar base advocates developed interest in construction on the Moon from constructor-engineer companies (e.g., Bechtel, Brown and Root, Fluor Daniel, etc.). After NASA began to officially perform lunar mission studies, these companies entered into collaborations with various aerospace companies. (The activity was so intense for a while that I was called by one aerospace contractor and asked if any of the construction companies were left.) In addition, the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), through its Aerospace Division initiated a series of specialty conferences on Engineering Construction, and Operations in Space (better known as SPACE88, SPACE90, etc.). The ASCE (110,000 members) also formed a Space Policy Committee to develop official position papers on space issues. The Exploration Office did receive politely delegations from the civil engineering companies and the ASCE It did enter into a Memorandum of Understanding with the Army Corps of Engineers to support conceptual design of lunar surface systems. However, inviting the construction industry to be a (political) partner in SEI never crossed the mind of NASA planners.
Four levels of questions must be answered in the affirmative at the national level within the political process before substantive discussions of lunar bases make any sense. First, should the United States have a space program? (If so, why?) Second, does human spaceflight have any role in the U.S. space program? (If so, what?) Third, does the regime of human spaceflight extend beyond transient visits to low Earth orbit? (If so, for what purpose?) Is permanent human presence in the solar system beyond the Earth a reasonable goal for the world's space programs within the time frame defined by our present technological horizons? (If so, what sort of objectives and schedule should we set for ourselves?)
Although these issues were resolved in the space policy of the Bush Administration, political consensus was never established with the Congress. NASA leadership assumed that political foundations would be laid by the White House and that the responsibility of the space agency was simply to explain the implementation of the policy. In other words, the President had given the orders; and NASA was to carry them out. Unfortunately, this attitude was extremely naive.
The rationale for a lunar base and the human exploration of space can be developed at several levels. Philosophical consensus is relatively easy to obtain. Historical analogs illustrate that human beings inevitably expand their domain of activities when it is possible to do so. However, the philosophical description gives no compelling reasons for establishing permanent human presence in space now.
The proposition that human exploration must be pursued within the U.S. space program can only be supported politically by demonstration of the relevance to current national needs. Unsubstantiated declarations from NASA of space benefits will be viewed inevitably as self-serving by some. Cost-benefit arguments will be much more convincing coming from outside the aerospace community. Advocacy can be developed outside the traditional space community if NASA is willing to share control and planning of the space program with other national interests that can legitimately benefit from space exploration. Such a fundamental change of policy can come only from the NASA Administrator or from the White House.
Essays on why humans ought to go to the Moon are useful only as learning experiences for the authors and as food for thought among space enthusiasts who need to be able to articulate their convictions. Persuasive prose will have no effect on the political (i.e., funding) process unless the writing is so great as to give birth to a new system of beliefs (i.e., religion). Implementation of a program of human exploration by the U.S. space program will not occur until the objectives and benefits of the activity can be expressed in the more mundane terms of national needs or are incorporated into a national vision of the future.
NASA funds various committees and task groups to explore the rationale for exploration of space and then ignores the results. Many of these documents are quite good and should be quoted by all of us more often. I particularly recommend the Report of the National Commission on Space[11] and the Report of the Synthesis Group.[4]
1. "President Bush Charts U.S. Space Course..." NASA Activities, July - August, 1989, pp 3 - 4.
2. Report of the 90-Day Study on Human Exploration of the Moon and Mars. NASA, November, 1989.
3. Report of the Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program. December, 1990. Supt. of Documents, U.S. Govt. Printing Office. 59 pp.
4. America at the Threshold. Report of the Synthesis Group on America's Space Exploration Initiative. May, 1991. Supt. of Documents, U.S. Govt. Printing Office. 113 pp.
5. Mendell, Wendell W. (1992) An SEI Proposal: A Lunar Telescope for Education. Paper prepared for and delivered at the Third International Conference on Engineering, Construction, and Operations in Space (SPACE92)
6. The Post-Apollo Space Program: Directions for the Future. Space Task Group Report to the President, September 1969.
7. Flam, Faye (1993) "NASA PR: Hype or Public Education?" News and Comment, Science, Vol260, p. 1416-1418, June, 1993.
8. Duke, Michael B. (1992) Why Explore the Moon? AIAA Paper 92-1029. Prepared for the 1992 Aerospace Design Conference, Feb. 3-6, 1992, Irvine, CA.
9. Adams, Robert McC. (1992) Why Explore the Universe? AIAA Paper 92-0617. Prepared for the 30th Aerospace Sciences Meeting, Jan. 6-9, 1992, Reno, NV.
10. Finney, Ben and Eric Jones, ed. (1985) Interstellar Migrations and the Human Experience. University of California Press, Berkeley.
11. Pioneering the Space Frontier. The Report of the National Commission on Space. May 1986. Bantam Books 211 pp.